Maritime transportation. Safety Management and Risk Analysis/Морские перевозки. Управление безопасностью и анализ рисков

Книга на английском языке
The environmental and human costs of marine accidents are high, and risks are considerable.At the same time, expectations from society for the safety of maritime transportation, like most other activities, increase continuously. To meet these expectations, systematic methods for understanding and managing the risksin a cost-efficient manner are needed. This book provides readers with an understanding of how to approach thisproblem.Firmly set within the context of the maritime industry, systematic methods for safety management and riskassessment are described. The legal framework and the risk picture within the maritime industry provide necessarycontext. Safety management is a continuous and wide-ranging process, with a set of methods and tools to supportthe process. The book provides guidance on how to approach safety management, with many examples from the maritime industry to illustrate practical use. This extensively revised new edition addresses the needs of students and professionals working in shippingmanagement, ship design and naval architecture, and transport management, as well as safety management, insurance, and accident investigation.

Content
Preface
Authors
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
1.2 International trade and shipping
1.3 Risk and safety
1.4 Anatomy of an accident
1.5 Managing risk
1.6 Motivation for writing the book
1.7 Scope
1.8 How to use the book
References
2 The risk picture
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Major accidents
2.1.2 Occupational accidents
2.1.3 Environmental factors
2.1.4 Flag
2.1.5 Age of ship
2.1.6 Discussion
2.2 Accident statistics
2.3 Maritime activity
2.4 Important accidents
2.5 Fatalities among seafarers
2.6 Oil spills and pollution
2.7 Effect of some factors on the risk level
References
3 Terminology
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Risk and safety
3.2.1 Risk
3.2.2 Positive risk
3.2.3 Other definitions of risk
3.2.4 Safety
3.2.5 Perceived risk vs calculated risk
3.2.6 Use of risk vs safety
3.3 Hazard and accident
3.3.1 An introduction to the bow-tie model
3.3.2 Hazard
3.3.3 Initiating event
3.3.4 Accident scenario
3.3.5 Causal factor
3.3.6 Accident
3.3.7 Incident and near miss
3.4 Frequency and probability
3.4.1 Probability
3.4.2 Frequency
3.5 Consequence
3.6 Safety management
3.7 Stakeholder
3.8 Risk analysis and risk assessment
3.9 Risk control and reduction
3.10 Risk acceptance criteria
References
4 Stakeholders, rules, and regulations
4.1 Introduction
4.2 International trade and shipping
4.2.1 Seaborne transport
4.2.2 Shipping markets
4.2.3 Ship types and trades
4.2.4 Economics of shipping
4.2.5 Competitiveness of shipping
4.3 The shipping industry system
4.3.1 Stakeholders
4.3.2 Corporate social responsibility
4.3.3 The shipowner
4.4 The maritime safety regime
4.4.1 Why safety improvement is difficult
4.4.2 Rules and regulations
4.4.3 The structure of control
4.4.4 International Maritime Organization (IMO)
4.5 Ship safety conventions
4.5.1 SOLAS
4.5.2 UNCLOS
4.5.3 International convention on load lines, 1966
4.5.4 STCW convention
4.5.5 MARPOL
4.5.6 The ISM Code
4.6 International Labour Organization
4.7 European Union
4.8 Enforcement of safety regulation
4.8.1 Flag State Control
4.8.2 Delegation of fag State Control
4.8.3 The Flag State audit project
4.9 Port State Control
4.9.1 UNCLOS
4.9.2 MOU Port State Control (PSC)
4.10 Classification Societies
4.11 Civil maritime law
References
5 Safety management system
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Prescriptive vs functional rules and regulations
5.3 Safety management in a wider perspective
5.4 Safety management process
5.4.1 Establish the context
5.4.2 Risk analysis
5.4.3 Risk evaluation
5.4.4 Propose measures to reduce risk
5.4.5 Decide and implement
5.4.6 Monitoring and reporting
5.4.7 Consultation and reporting
5.5 ISM Code
5.5.1 Background
5.5.2 The content of the ISM Code
5.6 Effect of the ISM Code
References
6 Risk acceptance
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Some factors affecting risk acceptance
6.2.1 Risk perception
6.2.2 Benefits
6.2.3 Risk aversion
6.2.4 Time since accidents and own experience
6.2.5 Time until effects are experienced
6.2.6 Lack of understanding of the risk
6.3 Decision-making principles
6.4 Individual vs societal risk acceptance criteria
6.5 ALARP
6.5.1 Achieving risk that is ALARP
6.6 Other principles for risk acceptance
6.7 Qualitative risk acceptance criteria
6.8 Acceptance criteria in the maritime industry
6.8.1 Criteria for risk to people
6.8.1.1 Individual risk
6.8.1.2 Societal risk
6.8.1.3 Converting injuries to fatalities
6.8.1.4 The equivalence principle
6.8.2 Environmental criteria
6.8.3 Criteria for other consequences
References
7 Human and organizational factors
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Human and organizational factors data
7.3 Classification of human and organizational factors
7.4 Human factors infuencing accidents
7.5 Fatigue
7.6 Physical working environment
7.6.1 Thermal climate
7.6.2 Noise
7.6.3 Vibration
7.7 Motion
7.8 Vision
7.8.1 Lookout
7.8.2 Night vision
7.8.3 Radar operation and vigilance
7.9 Situation awareness
7.10 Perception and decision making
7.10.1 False hypothesis
7.10.2 Habit
7.10.3 End-spurt effect
7.11 Communication
7.12 Bridge Resource Management
7.13 Human-machine interface (HMI)
7.14 Safety culture and safety climate
References
8 Risk analysis methods
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Risk assessment and risk analysis
8.2.1 A General Risk Assessment Process
8.2.2 Problem definition and system description
8.2.3 Work organization and choice of method and data
8.2.4 Hazard identification
8.2.5 Causal and frequency analysis
8.2.6 Consequence analysis
8.2.7 Risk presentation
8.2.8 Comparison with risk acceptance criteria
8.2.9 Identify and evaluate risk reduction measures
8.2.10 Reporting
8.2.11 Limitations of risk analysis
8.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
8.3.1 Introduction
8.3.2 Objectives
8.3.3 Applications
8.3.4 Method description
8.3.4.1 Preparations
8.3.4.2 Hazard identification
8.3.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
8.3.4.4 Consequence analysis
8.3.4.5 Result presentation
8.4 Safe Job Analysis (SJA)
8.4.1 Introduction
8.4.2 Objectives
8.4.3 Applications
8.4.4 Method description
8.4.4.1 Preparations
8.4.4.2 Hazard identification
8.4.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
8.4.4.4 Consequence analysis
8.4.4.5 Result presentation
8.5 FMECA
8.5.1 Introduction
8.5.2 Objectives
8.5.3 Applications
8.5.4 Method description
8.5.4.1 Preparations
8.5.4.2 Hazard identification
8.5.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
8.5.4.4 Consequence analysis
8.5.4.5 Result presentation
8.6 HAZOP
8.6.1 Introduction
8.6.2 Objectives
8.6.3 Applications
8.6.4 Method description
8.6.4.1 Preparations
8.6.4.2 Hazard identification
8.6.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
8.6.4.4 Consequence analysis
8.6.4.5 Result presentation
8.7 STPA
8.7.1 Introduction
8.7.2 Method description
8.7.3 Comparison with FMECA
8.8 Fault tree analysis
8.8.1 Constructing fault trees
8.8.2 Minimal cut sets
8.8.3 Quantification of fault trees
8.9 Event tree analysis
8.9.1 Principles
8.9.2 Constructing event trees
8.9.3 Quantification of event trees
8.10 Bayesian networks
8.10.1 Elements of a BN
8.10.2 Constructing a BN
8.10.3 Quantification of BN
8.10.4 Example
8.11 Risk contribution trees
8.12 Concluding remarks
References
9 Measuring risk
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Risk matrix
9.3 Measuring risk to people
9.3.1 Societal and individual risk 260
9.3.2 Injury risk
9.3.3 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
9.3.4 FN curve
9.3.5 Individual Risk (IR)
9.3.6 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)
9.3.7 Combining injuries and fatalities
9.4 Measuring risk to the environment
9.5 Measuring risk to other assets
9.5.1 Economic risk
9.5.2 Reputation
References
10 Methods for navigational risk analysis
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Groundings
10.2.1 Early studies of powered groundings
10.2.2 Developments of powered grounding models
10.2.3 Drift grounding
10.3 Allision with fixed offshore installations
10.3.1 Powered passing vessels
10.3.2 Allision with wind farms
10.3.3 Korean study
10.4 Ship collision
10.4.1 Basic approach
10.4.2 Head-on collisions
10.4.3 Crossing collision
10.4.4 Traffic modeling based on AIS observation
10.5 Causation probability
10.5.1 Empirical approach
10.5.2 Fault tree analysis (FTA)
10.5.3 Bayesian Belief Network
10.6 Qualitative methods
10.7 A final comment
References
11 Human reliability analysis
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Human reliability analysis
11.2.1 Problem definition
11.2.2 Task analysis
11.2.3 Human error identification
11.2.4 Error modeling
11.2.5 Human error probability HEP
11.3 The THERP method
11.3.1 Human error identification by means of PHEA
11.3.2 Error modeling by means of THERP
11.3.3 HEP estimation in THERP
11.3.4 Data on HEPs and PSFs in THERP
11.4 The CREAM method
11.4.1 Human error identification by means of CREAM
11.4.2 Error modeling by means of CREAM
11.4.3 HEP estimation in CREAM
11.4.3.1 Basic method
11.4.3.2 Extended method
11.5 Human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART)
11.6 Application of THERP in transport
11.6.1 Crew error in aircraft takeoff
11.6.2 Human contribution in marine traffic accidents
11.7 Application of CREAM in transport
11.8 Calibration of an HRA model with accident data
References
12 Formal safety assessment
12.1 Introduction
12.1.1 Background to FSA
12.1.2 Intended use of FSA
12.2 FSA approach
12.3 Preparatory step
12.3.1 Problem definition
12.3.2 The generic ship
12.3.3 Stakeholders
12.4 Step 1: Hazard identification
12.4.1 Step 1.1: Identify hazards
12.4.2 Step 1.2: Describe structured scenarios
12.4.3 Step 1.3: Rank and screen scenarios
12.5 Step 2: Risk assessment
12.5.1 Step 2.1 Qualitative scenario descriptions
12.5.2 Step 2.2 Quantify scenarios
12.5.3 Step 2.3 Calculate risk
12.5.4 Step 2.4 Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses
12.6 Step 3: Establish safety measures
12.6.1 RCM and RCO
12.6.2 Step 3.1 Areas needing control
12.6.3 Step 3.2 Identify risk control measures
12.6.4 Step 3.3: Grouping risk control measures
12.6.5 Step 3.4: Evaluating the effectiveness of RCMs/RCOs
12.7 Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment
12.7.1 Step 4.1: Baseline assumptions and conditions
12.7.2 Step 4.2: Calculate costs
12.7.3 Step 4.3: Calculate benefits
12.7.4 Step 4.4: Calculate cost-effectiveness
12.7.5 Step 4.5: Evaluating uncertainty
12.8 Recommendations for decision-making
12.9 Application of the FSA methodology
12.9.1 Step 1: Hazard identification
12.9.2 Step 2: Risk assessment
12.9.3 Step 3: Establish safety measures (risk control options)
12.9.4 Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment
12.9.5 Step 5: Recommendations for decision-making
12.10 Final comments
References
13 Security
13.1 Introduction
13.1.1 Threats in the delivery phase
13.1.2 Threats to seaborne transport
13.1.3 Cyber threats
13.2 Improving the security in the cargo supply chain
13.2.1 US legislation
13.2.2 ISPS Code
13.2.3 SOLAS
13.2.4 ISM Code
13.2.5 Container security
13.3 Security onboard
13.3.1 Compliance costs for the shipowner
13.4 Piracy in history
13.4.1 Definition of piracy today
13.5 Piracy today
13.5.1 Locations of piracy
13.5.2 Somali piracy
13.6 Combating piracy
13.6.1 Combating piracy in Somalia
13.6.2 Legal framework
13.6.3 Military actions
13.6.4 Economic reform
13.7 Vessel security against piracy
13.7.1 Risk assessment of vessel
13.7.2 Operative measures
13.7.3 Protection of vessel
13.7.4 Cyber security and risk management
References
14 Accident data
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Types of data needed in risk analysis
14.2.1 Technical data
14.2.2 Operational data
14.2.3 Environmental data
14.2.4 Event data
14.2.5 Input to fault trees and event trees
14.2.6 Consequence data
14.3 Evaluating data sources
14.4 Frequency and consequence
14.4.1 Shipping statistics yearbook
14.4.2 Data from Sea-web
14.4.3 Annual overview from EMSA
14.4.4 Data from national maritime administrations
14.4.4.1 The United Kingdom and Canada
14.4.5 Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) of Japan
14.5 Accident taxonomies
14.5.1 Skill-rule-knowledge model
14.5.2 SHEL model
14.5.3 Swiss Cheese Model (SCM)
14.5.4 MSCAT
14.5.5 MaRCAT
14.5.6 HFACS- Maritime
14.6 Causal factor data
14.6.1 Port state control findings
14.6.2 Data from accident investigations
14.6.3 SIRC study
14.6.4 Finnish study
14.6.5 Powered grounding accidents
14.6.5.1 Causal factors
14.6.5.2 Track history of vessel
14.7 Traffc data
References
15 Risk reduction measures
15.1 Introduction 467
15.2 Barriers and barrier classification
15.2.1 What is a barrier?
15.2.2 RCM and RCO
15.2.3 Classification of barriers
15.2.3.1 Classifications based on accident sequence
15.2.3.2 Classifications based on type of barrier
15.2.3.3 Classification based on function
15.2.4 Barrier properties
15.2.4.1 Specific
15.2.4.2 Functional
15.2.4.3 Reliable
15.2.4.4 Verifiable
15.2.5 Attributes of RCMs from IMO
15.3 Identifying risk reduction measures
15.4 Evaluating and prioritizing risk reduction measures
15.4.1 Effects on risk
15.4.2 Reliability
15.4.3 Verifiability
15.4.4 Independence
15.4.5 Where in event chain
15.4.6 Duration
15.4.7 Cost
15.4.8 Summary
15.5 Cost-benefit analysis
15.5.1 Economic theory
15.5.2 Cost optimization
15.5.3 CBA in safety management
15.5.4 Cost-benefit analysis methodologies
15.5.5 Establishing criteria for ICAF
15.6 Case study: oil spill prevention measures for tankers
15.7 Alternative approaches to selection
15.7.1 Ranking of concepts
15.7.2 Relative importance ranking
15.7.3 Valuation of consequence parameters
15.8 Barrier management in operation
References
16 Emergency preparedness and response
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Examples of accidents
16.2.1 Amoco Cadiz
16.2.2 Capitaine Tasman
16.2.3 HSC Sleipner
16.2.4 Costa Concordia
16.3 Principles of emergency response
16.4 Emergency and life-saving regulations
16.4.1 SOLAS
16.4.2 ISM Code: emergency preparedness
16.4.3 STCW requirements
16.5 Emergency preparedness activities and functions
16.5.1 Planning
16.5.2 Land support
16.5.3 Decision support
16.6 Human behavior in emergency situations
16.6.1 General characterization
16.6.2 Emergency behavior
16.7 Evacuation risk
16.8 Evacuation simulation
16.8.1 Crowd behavior 548 16.8.2 Modeling the evacuation process
16.8.3 A Simulation case
16.8.4 Evacuation from partly capsized vessels
16.8.5 Designing for safe evacuation
16.9 Pollution emergency planning
16.9.1 MARPOL
Appendices
References
17 Risk-based design
17.1 Introduction
17.2 IMO regulations
17.3 Approach to risk-based design
17.4 Approval process according to MSC 1455
17.5 Probabilistic damage stability
References
18 Monitoring risk level
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Monitoring loss numbers
18.2.1 Time series of grounding accidents
18.3 Analysis of time series
18.4 Maritime disasters with many fatalities
18.5 Fitting a non-parametric distribution
18.6 The lognormal distribution
18.6.1 Definitions
18.6.2 Fitting a parametric distribution to observed data
18.7 Estimating a worst-case scenario
18.7.1 A simple approach based on distribution function
18.7.2 The extreme value distributions
18.7.3 EVT estimation of tanker oil spills
18.8 Analysis of competence – correlation coefficient
18.9 Testing of a distribution – lost time accidents
18.10 Choosing among alternative training programs
18.11 The effect of time – control charts
References
19 Learning from accidents and incidents
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Regulations
19.3 Causes of accidents and near-miss
19.4 Accident theories
19.4.1 Energy-barrier models
19.4.2 Sequential models
19.4.3 Epidemiological models
19.4.4 Systemic models
19.5 STEP
19.6 MTO method
19.6.1 Flowcharting
19.7 Loss Causation Model and M-SCAT
19.7.1 Background
19.7.2 The basics
19.7.3 Taxonomy
19.7.4 M-SCAT
19.8 Accident investigation process
19.8.1 Overview of process
19.8.2 Step 1: Initiate the investigation
19.8.3 Step 2: Preparations
19.8.4 Step 3: Collecting evidence
19.8.5 Step 4: Analyzing evidence
19.8.6 Step 5: Prepare recommendations
19.8.7 Step 6: Prepare report
19.9 The accident report
19.10 Near-miss investigations
19.11 Accident investigation reports
MAIB - Marine Accident Investigation Branch (UK)
NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (USA)
Dutch Safety Board - about 100 reports
Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority - about 100 reports
TSB - Transportation Safety Board of Canada
ATSB - Australian Transport Safety Bureau
References
Index